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“The Problem With Our Borders in Batken”: Local 
Understandings of Border Control and Sovereignty 
in Kyrgyzstan
Steven Parham 
When the post-Soviet state of Kyrgyzstan recently celebrated its twentieth 
anniversary, it was commemorating not just two decades of “standing up and 
flourishing” in the land where the “dreams of the people came true” under 
the “flag of liberty,” in the words of the national anthem adopted in 1992.1
Exhortations in the new Constitution of 2010 to the state’s “unstinting con-
viction” to “protect state sovereignty and unity of the people” and to “serve 
for the benefit of the entire society” came amidst rising concern over precise-
ly how much control the state actually has over the fate of Kyrgyz border-
landers in the country’s far-flung South.2 In effect, the state was also mark-
ing twenty years of the concept of a citizenship tied to a very concrete notion 
of a national territory in which “rightful belonging” entitled Kyrgyzstanis—
often subtly and problematically glossed as “Kyrgyz”—to claim the re-
sources of the state in terms of a bordered identity. With the overwhelming 
majority of Kyrgyzstan’s more than five million inhabitants residing in the 
immediate vicinity of newly international borderlines, the ways in which the 
edges of the state are to be practiced in politically fractured spaces play a 
vital role in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstani lifeworlds and livelihoods. The Fergha-
na Valley in Kyrgyzstan’s south is such a region of contestation, made all the 
more immediate by its tattered borders, its traditional belonging to a larger 
area (the socio-economy of the Valley itself) than colors on the contemporary 
map would suggest, and its now century-long history of calling into question 
distant states’ policies of control.
                                                          
1 In the Kyrgyz original, “Örkündöy ber, ösö ber” and “Atkarylyp eldin ümüt, tilegi; Zhel-
biredi erkindiktin zhelegi.”
2 Quotes taken from, respectively, the Preamble and Article 5 of the unofficial English ver-
sion of the “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic” (adopted by referendum on June 27, 
2010) translated from Russian by the European Union-UN Development Programme (EU-
UNDP) Project on Support to the Constitutional and Parliamentary Reforms and OSCE Of-
fice for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, accessed February 7, 2014, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/87546/99880/F1398573553/KGZ87546
.pdf.
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The Kyrgyzstani oblast’ (region) of Batken is the locus of a vibrant so-
cio-political dynamism that is usually cast in terms of interethnic conflict and 
political instability arising from the complex intermeshing of contested state 
territoriality, uncertain ethno-political loyalties, and a new economic periph-
erality. Batken today is a region of Kyrgyzstan only tenuously connected to 
the state that Kyrgyz claim as their meken, their homeland: roads intersect 
non-Kyrgyzstani territories, water is predominantly used for the agricultural 
needs of those described locally as non-Kyrgyz, dialects differ from the lan-
guage used by other Kyrgyz-speakers farther north. However, for the Kyr-
gyzstani state the territory of Batken oblast’ has come to symbolize some-
thing much larger and more significant than its cartographic isolation sug-
gests. Conflict in this administrative territory (which was carved out from 
Osh oblast’ in 1999) plays a role far beyond these impoverished and remote 
villages: a monument erected in the very heart of Bishkek in 2004 eulogizes 
the “heroes of Batken” who gave their lives to defend this outpost from what 
has been termed an incursion by Uzbek militants in the months before the 
creation of the oblast’; and policy commentators in Moscow, Brussels and 
Washington debate local ethnic distribution and the capacities of the state 
here to defend its borders along trafficking routes for narcotics originating in 
Afghanistan and terminating in Russia and the capitals of Europe. “Our bor-
ders seem to interest all sorts of people [...]. Maybe they should come and 
spend some years living along them to see what the problems here are and 
are not?,” a local historian and teacher exclaimed in Batken in September 
2013 after a long conversation on local memories of border-making in the 
Ferghana Valley.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all the new Central Asian Re-
publics have been faced with complex socio-political realignments. In this 
they have been bound politically by the conventional rules of a “nation-state” 
system that tolerates no territorial inconsistencies in terms of state sovereign-
ty and that is loath to renegotiate lines on maps. Formerly internal boundaries 
within the Soviet Union, which were in effect borders in only an administra-
tive sense, have become state borders. This has allowed friction between 
groups that now find themselves on territories claimed by states struggling to 
assert their legitimacy to be expressed in three arenas: internally, to “their 
own” titular group as well as vis-à-vis non-titular citizens (frequently, and 
most controversially, sharing an ethnonym with a neighboring titular state); 
externally, to similarly new, neighboring titular states; and, on an interna-
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tional stage, to an audience accustomed to regarding the entire region 
through the twin lenses of contested ethnopolitical categorization and a de-
cline in geopolitical stability, so often (since 2001) expressed in terms of 
these post-Soviet states’ proximity to Afghanistan. In the case of Kyrgyz-
stan’s territory in the Ferghana Valley, these three arenas come together over 
the composition of this state’s borders, which can be seen as the locus in 
which conflicts between villagers become weighty matters of state. Important 
questions arise over how such local conflict has the potential to become a 
conflict between the states of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; and 
how such conflicts highlight a larger, regional narrative that is of interest to 
non-regional parties such as the European Union (that provides the Kyrgyz-
stani state with logistical support and a framework of border management 
deriving from European contexts) and the Russian Federation (that provides 
military hardware to the state).3
This contribution shifts our attention away from representations of Kyr-
gyzstan’s borders as being dysfunctional and in need of fixing because their 
“sub-basic infrastructure” in a region “especially prone to volatility” requires 
“cross-border collaboration [that] needs to improve considerably given the 
volatile security situation in the region.”4 Leaving aside vaguely defined no-
tions of their role in threatening “regional stability,” I focus on the interplay 
of how borders here are discussed and represented by Kyrgyz borderland 
inhabitants and the Kyrgyzstani state. Such a borderland perspective affords 
us an appropriate vantage point from which to reflect upon a range of behav-
iors as well as the parameters of local boundary-making and boundary-
reproducing processes because it inflects readily observable inscriptions of 
the state in locales “where the operation of state power is both naked and 
hidden from view.”5 I ask how border control in Batken relates to powerful 
narratives of threat in this region of Kyrgyzstan where the state has been 
struggling to assert its control. I address this question by discussing, first, 
                                                          
3 According to the Border Service at the Kyrgyz National Security Committee, Russian sup-
port comes in the framework of the “Brothers Fighting for Fixed Borders” program (as 
quoted by Deidre Tynan, “Central Asia: Russia Taking Steps to Reinforce Security Rela-
tionships,” Eurasianet, February 2, 2012, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64946).
4 See the Introduction section of the Outline of the EU-UNDP Border Management Assis-
tance Programme in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, April 2012, accessed February 7, 2014, 
http://www.bomca.eu/en/kyr.html.
5 Mark B. Salter, “The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the Interna-
tional Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 31, no. 2 
(2006): 185.
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how state authorities and locals express, contest or argue for the new signifi-
cance of border control; and, second, in which manner such Afghanistan-
driven narratives relate to local lifeworlds in Batken. By using as my sources 
data generated in long-term and repeated anthropological fieldwork as well 
as local media reports and publications of donor organizations active in the 
Ferghana Valley,6 I argue that the contentious question of enforcing control 
over a contested borderline (the “naked” control by the state) contains two 
dimensions, both of which revolve around a new practice of sovereignty. On 
the one hand, the state can be seen to pursue a course of centralizing control 
over Batken by casting local conflict as arising from the lack of sufficient 
and actually implemented border control, thus connecting border porosity 
here with the specter of increasing “regional instability” in Afghanistan’s 
neighborhood. From the perspective of the borderlands themselves, on the 
other hand, conflict over control of land and water usage, both of which are 
issues with a long history of contestation, have increasingly come to be ex-
pressed in the language of citizenship rather than merely ethnic affiliation, 
thereby presenting us with an example of “hidden” state control.
Local understandings of border control and state sovereignty in Batken 
oblast’ depend on perceptions of the manner in which the Kyrgyzstani state 
has chosen to inscribe control by the centre onto its periphery; thus, this con-
tribution begins by discussing domestic representations of the status of the
state’s actual control over its territory and how this is communicated to the 
outside world. The role that border control plays in this regard, and the ways 
in which the state regards outside assistance in this domain, shall be critically 
examined in light of its impact on local lifeworlds. The second section focus-
es on how borderlanders in Batken themselves witness the waxing drive for 
central control over their locales. Here, by following local voices I present 
ways in which locals attempt to lay claim to bordering processes through 
their highlighting of historical and contemporary tropes of (dis)connectivity 
and belonging, and how new manifestations of border control are received 
and appraised by those most directly exposed to them. I conclude by discuss-
ing how borderlanders characterize their position in relation to processes un-
                                                          
6 All quotations from interviews in this contribution were recorded during fieldwork con-
ducted between August and November 2013. A total of twenty-one semi-structured inter-
views were conducted (sixteen in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken and Osh oblast’s, and five in Tajik-
istan’s Sughd oblast’) in Russian; all translations into English are by the author. Names of 
interviewees have been altered throughout. The author expresses his especial gratitude to 
Martyn Aim and Erjan Sydykbekov for support during fieldwork.
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leashed by Kyrgyzstani concern over how Afghanistan after the Western mil-
itary withdraws might affect domestic lifeworlds as well as state sovereignty 
in Batken.
Inscribing State Control onto Batken
Speaking of the pressures generated by a project of delimiting and demarcat-
ing the state’s new borders, a Kyrgyzstani ambassador in a speech held at a 
seminar organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (OSCE) in 2011 clearly underlined the need for “strong political will” 
by the state in the face of local opposition to the work of boundary commis-
sions charged with resolving disputes over contested territories, who are of-
ten “accused of treachery” by local inhabitants.7 The inhabitants leveling 
such accusations of treachery at the Kyrgyzstani state are invariably border-
landers identifying themselves confidently as Kyrgyz—in other words, local 
villagers claiming specific territories inhabited by Kyrgyz as inalienable parts 
of Kyrgyzstan and not being up for territorial renegotiation with a neighbor-
ing state regardless of whether Tajiks or Uzbeks live there. As a successor 
state to the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan inherited strong regionally based pat-
ronage networks serving as the basis for the allocation of scarce economic 
and political resources, and which had been instrumental in developing ro-
bust administrative-territorial identities linked to the respective sub-divisions 
of the Union.8 The Soviet Union had taken the process of nation-building 
very seriously, and the system of titular nations (the Kyrgyz, the Tajiks, etc.) 
still provides groups in this region with the parameters of the negotiation of 
political power. As a state, however, this heir to the USSR was not imbued 
with the resources to implement on-the-ground border control at its new bor-
ders: even in the immediate neighborhood of the capital city in the north, 
along the new Kazakhstani borderline, manifestations of state control at the 
frontier were not to appear until a decade had passed.
                                                          
7 Erik Asanaliev, Ambassador of the Kyrgyz Republic in Belarus, speaking at an OSCE Bor-
ders Team Seminar in Vilnius, May–June, 2011, http://www.osce.org/cpc/85263?
download=true.
8 Pauline Jones-Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central 
Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 69–73.
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Such a pronounced dearth of symbols relating to the actual implementa-
tion of practices of territorial sovereignty has continued to this day to charac-
terize the Kyrgyzstani state at its margins. In the far-flung south of the coun-
try, it was not until the “Batken war” of 1999 that central authorities found 
themselves unable any longer to ignore the issue of national control of 
“their” territory.9 Represented as an infiltration of Kyrgyzstani territory by a 
large group of Uzbek militants belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbek-
istan, neighboring Uzbekistan began the contentious project of unilaterally 
laying mines along what it regarded as its borderline with Kyrgyzstan, at that 
time a line that was largely neither delimited nor demarcated in a mutually 
acceptable form.10 A decade later, in another part of southern Kyrgyzstan, 
the borderline between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was once again in the 
centre of regional states’ attention when Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, believing 
themselves to be persecuted by local (Kyrgyz) authorities in the southern city 
of Osh, temporarily fled across the border to Uzbekistan’s section of the Fer-
ghana Valley. Coinciding with the collapse of central authorities’ power in 
Bishkek and the ouster of President Bakiev in 2010, the state’s control over 
its territory was called into question even more fundamentally:
“I cannot answer this question for sure—[whether] we control the territory in the 
south of my country 100 percent. That’s because of such objective factors as the 
lingering tension between these two ethnic groups [and] because of the mistrust 
and lack of confidence of the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz communities toward lo-
cal law enforcement bodies.”11
The issue of the relationship between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks on Kyrgyzstan’s 
territory is explicitly linked to failing control over the periphery by the cen-
                                                          
9 By this time only roughly half of the 971-kilometre-long Kyrgyzstani-Tajikistani and a 
quarter of the 1,378-kilometre-long Kyrgyzstani-Uzbekistani borders had been officially 
agreed upon; see Necati Polat, Boundary Issues in Central Asia (Ardsley: Transnational 
Publishers, 2002), 51–59. Today this has remained at a similar level for the Kyrgyzstani-
Tajikistani border and risen to nearly three-quarters along the Kyrgyzstani-Uzbekistani bor-
der (as reported in “Working groups on delimitation and demarcation of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek 
state border met in Uzbekistan,” Kabar, January 29, 2014, http://www.kabar.kg/eng
/politics/full/9040).
10 George Gavrilis, The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 108.
11 Arslan Anarbaev, former Interim Head of the Kyrgyz Embassy in Washington, in an inter-
view with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 6, 2010,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kyrgyz_Envoy_To_US_Says_Interethnic_Reconciliation_Cou
ld_Take_Decades/2120445.html.
57
tre, in part at least deriving from local suspicions over the state’s objectives 
in mediating between the fraught categories of ethnicity (as expressed in 
terms of tension between local communities) and the institutions of a central-
ized Kyrgyzstani state as represented by local law enforcement bodies.
While widely reported bloodshed between these groups was limited to 
Osh and its immediate environs, farther west in Batken incidents between 
Kyrgyz and their Uzbek and Tajik neighbors have become seemingly both 
more frequent and more violent since 2010. Such conflict often arises from 
the contentious purchase of construction land by non-Kyrgyz or the domina-
tion by certain groups (usually ascribed with a non-Kyrgyz ethnic identity 
but not necessarily non-Kyrgyzstani citizenship) over the few remaining eco-
nomic lifelines leading out of remote valleys and, invariably, across border-
lines even in cases where the ultimate anchor of exchange is itself on Kyr-
gyzstani territory (such as is the case in direct trade between Batken and 
Bishkek or Osh). Local media have reported a significant increase since 2010 
in incidents that have included, inter alia, reciprocal kidnappings of Kyrgyz 
and Tajiks or Uzbeks, gun battles between borderlanders and border guards, 
the destruction of property linked to non-Kyrgyz ownership, and a barrage of 
accusations of border violations by citizens of Kyrgyzstan crossing into terri-
tory claimed by Tajikistan (the Vorukh enclave) or Uzbekistan (the Sokh 
enclave) and vice versa.12 What is at stake here is, in the words of the gov-
ernment, “the social and economic development of borderline territories” 
which has been negatively affected by the “problem of border management 
and lack of border infrastructure.”13
A majority of the Soviet Union’s successor states have been confronted 
with an imprecise fit between territorial allocation of political power within 
units defined by the larger context of the USSR and actual control over bor-
                                                          
12 See, for example, Natalia Yefimova-Trilling and David Trilling, “Kyrgyzstan & Tajikistan: 
Disputed Border Heightens Risk of Conflict,” Eurasianet, August 2, 2012,
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65744; Mirlan Alymbekov, “Border conflicts: no alterna-
tive to negotiations,” Kabar, January 27, 2015, http://kabar.kg/eng/analytics/full/9002.
For an excellent discussion of Sokh border conflict, see Madeleine Reeves, “The Time of 
the Border: Contingency, Conflict, and Popular Statism at the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan 
Boundary,” in Ethnographies of the State in Central Asia. Performing Politics, ed. Made-
leine Reeves, Johan Rasanayagam, and Judith Beyer (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2014), 198–220.
13 OSCE, “Speech of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, H.E. Mr. Erlan 
Abdyldaev on the 20th session of the Council of the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE
Member States,” December 5, 2013, http://www.osce.org/mc/109230?download=true.
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derland processes at the edges of those units. Kyrgyzstan, alongside its west-
ern and southern neighbors, has however benefited from the exceptional at-
tention accorded to its borders and, by implication, to its weak central control
over the movement of people and goods through its periphery by distant 
states due to its location. In a telling choice of imagery, the Foreign Ministry 
of Finland, which is a donor country that lacks a historical background to its 
relations in the region but which has been instrumental in recent years in 
broaching regional border porosity for the European Union and the OSCE, 
tersely introduces Central Asia with:
“The geopolitical situation in Central Asia is challenging: drug routes run from 
Afghanistan through Central Asia to Russia and Europe, and the unpredictability 
of the situation in Afghanistan and the neighboring states causes concern about a 
build-up of extremist Islamic movements in the region.”14
By emphasizing an imagery of regions that are successively penetrated, this 
European Union member state correlates the violation of European territory 
with failures of border control closer to the source of such undesirable new 
flows. To the European Union and, due to its position in-between, the Rus-
sian Federation, Kyrgyzstan (and its neighbors Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) 
seems to resemble what northern Mexico is to the United States: a drug-
infested borderland that fails to stem the flow of narcotics to where those 
who consume most of these drugs reside. Following the caesura of Septem-
ber 2001, Kyrgyzstan took its commitment to ousting the Taliban in Afghan-
istan very seriously, going so far as permitting the operation of the first non-
Soviet military base on former Soviet territory, which opened at Manas air-
port near Bishkek in December 2001. Mindful of public perceptions in a state 
that never rejected its crucial ties of socio-economic exchange with the Rus-
sian Federation, a second, Russian military base has similarly been permitted 
to operate at Kant since October 2003, in the immediate neighborhood of the 
airbase leased to the U.S. at Manas. The Russian state may well disagree with 
the military objectives and permissibility of such a base, and yet both of these
outside forces share a common concern over the factors alluded to in the cita-
tion above. In effect, it is the status of Kyrgyzstani border management that 
                                                          
14 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Wider Europe Initiative: Finland’s Develop-
ment Policy Framework Programme,” June 2009, available at 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentId=167831&nodeId=15445&contentlan
=2&culture=en-US.
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is the focal point for such outside interest, and pressure has been brought to 
bear upon the Kyrgyzstani state to get its borders “under control” in the in-
terest of “wider regional stability.”
Alerted to global representations of Central Asia as a “first line of de-
fense” in terms of preventing instability in Afghanistan from “spilling over” 
its borders, the Kyrgyzstani state has not argued against the imagery of glob-
al threat clinging to outside characterizations of local state weakness. Instead, 
such threats have been reformulated to relate to Kyrgyzstani lifeworlds in an 
immediate manner. Thus, Kyrgyzstani Foreign Minister E. Abdyldaev re-
cently stated:
“Kyrgyzstan is greatly influenced by the Afghan drug trafficking. In the last 
years drug-expansion has become more aggressive, being the main source of 
danger to the gene pool, contributing to transnational organized crime, terrorism, 
and extremism. Porous borders, weak equipment of the respective agencies, lack 
of human resources, and insufficient anti-drug propaganda affect the fight against 
illicit drug trafficking.”15
The connection between internal processes and outside attention (which is, 
first and foremost, focused on matters pertaining to Afghanistan) has been 
made explicit in the context of the Ferghana Valley’s contested borders. 
Thus, state elites suggest that there exists a direct correlation between local 
conflict in Batken and processes originating from beyond the state’s borders. 
The combustible mix of new economic peripherality and insistent calls for 
the pre-eminence of the titular Kyrgyz within the Kyrgyzstani state has coin-
cided with a steady increase in a rhetoric that links border violation from 
without with (in)stability within. In the words of A. Anarbaev, at the time 
Head of the Kyrgyzstani Embassy in the United States:
“The interests of [certain] internal destructive forces match the interests of exter-
nal ones, located in neighboring countries—radical Islamism and drug traffick-
ing. Matching interests unite those groups and may, God forbid, create a new 
burst of tension in our country. That’s why our government pays a lot of atten-
tion to border security.”16
“Border security” and the juxtaposition of “internal and external destructive 
forces” are tropes that belong firmly within a language of enclosure that 
                                                          
15 OSCE, “Speech of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.”
16 Arslan Anarbaev, in an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
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characterizes the legitimacy of imposing sovereignty over the entire territory 
of the state. As a consequence of territorial enclosure, regions formerly at the 
heart of a larger market space can now become peripheral: deprived of its 
regionally predicated raison d’être, Batken has become an outpost of an evis-
cerated economy. The new reality of Batken’s economic peripherality is 
highlighted, and its plight reproduced, by what has been described, in a more 
general context, as states’ efforts to curb cross-boundary trade and transfron-
tier systems of production.17 Such peripherality is a characteristic conse-
quence of giving precedence to the political aspects of a borderland over and 
beyond its economic well-being: it stems from a core’s political needs and 
not from considerations of economic opportunity, especially when a bounda-
ry divides (from the state’s point of view) two political systems and two eco-
nomic systems that are potentially in conflict with one another.18
The Kyrgyzstani state claims to identify the solution to local conflict 
along its southern borders as lying in better implementation of border con-
trol. Arguing that “[t]he present and future of a state depends not only on its 
internal development but also on the nature of that country’s contact with the 
outside world and the ability to secure its interests, including through border 
security,” this state locates a critical threat to national security in “the out-
flow of the working-age population from the border regions deeper into, as 
well as out of the country, resulting in land reclamation by inhabitants of 
neighboring states.”19 By characterizing local conflict over land and water in 
its remote southern region of Batken as crucially involving territorial viola-
tion arising from overly porous borders, the specter of ever increasing re-
gional instability is invoked. Yet, as is evident in such pronouncements by 
state representatives, the state’s desire for increased control over internal 
movement is intrinsic to the desire to control the borderlands themselves. It is 
such a desire to “monopolize the means of movement” that lies at the heart of 
the drive to introduce techniques of identification and thereby unambiguous-
ly establish state identities (“citizenships”) through documentation such as 
passports, identity cards, and internal permits (propuski).20
                                                          
17 Niles Hansen, The Border Economy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), 23–24.
18 James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd, “Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contra-
dictory Meanings, Changing Significance,” Regional Studies 33, no. 7 (1999): 593–604.
19 Resolution no. 183 passed by the government of Kyrgyzstan, March 6, 2012, accessed 
February 7, 2014, http://www.bomca.eu/en/partnership/92-ibm.html.
20 John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5–10.
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The speedy creation of new borderline infrastructure has not failed to 
come about because of a lack of societal experience and awareness of the 
functions of border control: a rarely acknowledged fact in the context of Cen-
tral Asian border control is that the polity of Kyrgyzstan has a half-century 
history of actually implementing border control on certain parts of its territo-
ry, namely along the former external boundaries of the Soviet Union (to the 
east with the People’s Republic of China, in this case). Practices of border 
control are widely remembered within societies that experienced a high de-
gree of militarization even in the 1980s. Instead, this has not occurred be-
cause of, first, the newly independent state’s incapacities in terms of the re-
sources to construct new, state-internal rather than regional, infrastructures 
and, second, the development of a clear narrative of “neighborliness.” Una-
ble independently to muster sufficient resources for such an enterprise and 
unable to cooperate directly with neighboring states in the contemporary 
framework of mutual distrust over borders, state elites have found it expedi-
ent to turn to outside assistance. This assistance can be seen as a type of re-
source that the state has generated by pursuing a narrative of great interest to 
outsiders: proximity to Afghanistan and the perceived threats that that post-
Taliban state poses beyond Central Asia’s borders. It is suggested that more 
central control over such remote peripheries is to the advantage of a con-
cerned outside world because it
“[…] enhances national and regional security, promotes global security, creates 
preconditions favorable to the implementation and development of the individual 
and society, stimulates the socio-economic and democratic development of the 
state, enhances the role of law, [and] strengthens mutually beneficial relation-
ships with other countries of the region and the world.”21
In this formulation, the Kyrgyzstani state represents itself as a responsible 
member of an international community of states as well as professing its wish 
to promote “neighborliness.” The existence of Kyrgyzstan as a state within 
such a community entails the diktat of sovereign control over territory, em-
bodied by a new infrastructure of border closure – in effect, new regimes of 
border control. Border control, “the sum of a state’s institutions to regulate 
the movement of people, communication, and goods across external bounda-
                                                          
21 Resolution no. 183 passed by the government of Kyrgyzstan.
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ries,”22 represents the most visible manifestation of a state’s narrative of con-
trol over its territory by making the state legible to outsiders as well as to 
citizens, and it figures prominently in the international political system of 
states that dominates global discourses of foreign policy. The mechanisms 
and artifacts pertaining to the surveillance of the borderline itself project the 
parameters of sovereignty from the centre to the periphery through the mi-
cropolitics of border control and the powerful class of agents of border con-
trol, such as customs officials, border guards, and numerous police forces 
and state security agencies.23 The functions that such normative control are 
meant to have are easily divided into vigilance, monitoring, and restriction. 
These functions are accomplished through militarization, surveillance tech-
niques, and state-endorsed “gatekeepers” such as border guards and customs 
officials. Furthermore, such bureaucracies of control serve to “embrace” and 
keep track of both those who legitimately “belong to the state” (its citizens) 
as well as those temporarily on state territory.24 It is this convention of border
control that Kyrgyzstan has accepted through its emphatic endorsement of 
the border management concepts developed by the OSCE and the European 
Union’s Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), thereby 
embracing a narrative of keeping borders “open yet secure” in order to pre-
vent “terrorism” and the smuggling of contraband.
But what does such assistance mean for the implementation of border 
control in a locality such as Batken? Forced to consider budget allocations, 
the state is moving away from the traditional Soviet-era convention of mili-
tary and para-military border control to “a special, multi-disciplinary [sic.] 
national system, which operates with wide-ranging powers and capabilities 
for the integrated protection of the interests of the country at the state border, 
in the border area, and throughout the regions of the country.”25 In effect, 
this means the replacement of Kyrgyzstani army units with a professional 
corps of border troops and “the establishment of functioning civilian control 
over the activities of border security agencies, the gradual implementation of 
                                                          
22 Andrea Chandler, Institutions of Isolation. Border Controls in the Soviet Union and Its 
Successor States, 1917–1993 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998), 19.
23 However, for a critical distinction between the goals of such control and the power of those 
actually implementing these goals, see Josiah McC. Heyman, “Putting Power in the An-
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operative-mobile methods in border patrol, the full professionalization of the 
border service (that is giving up enrolling conscripts in the border ser-
vice).”26 Such “professionalization” visibly goes hand-in-hand with the con-
struction of watchtowers, training centers, and border post amenities; and it is
accompanied by the appearance of new vehicles, patrol and sniffer dogs, and 
new uniforms. Contractors are constructing new border infrastructure (truck 
inspection units, border outposts, road upgrading as well as new road con-
struction that by-passes pockets of extra-territorial spaces, communication 
towers, and barracks), and like this the landscapes of Batken’s borderlands 
are slowly being transformed to resemble physically the outpost of Kyrgyz-
stan that they have long figured as in representations in far-away Bishkek.
Borderlanders Laying Claim to Batken’s Borders
Confronted with such remodeled border control designed to harden borders 
here, Kyrgyz borderlanders in Batken choose to emphasize their own partici-
pation in boundary-making and boundary-reproduction. By no means merely 
on-lookers while states have come and gone from the region, borderlanders 
clearly express their attitudes towards such changes. Local representations of 
such change here hinge on historical rights as marked on old maps, often by 
using a vocabulary of entitlement introduced from afar; and borderlanders 
violate borders when these do not agree with tried and tested forms of inter-
action with their neighbors. In order to approach the framework within which 
interaction with the state has taken place from a local perspective, I quote at 
length the sweep of history that Amir, a local historian in Batken and a for-
mer engineer with the Red Army in distant Chernobyl, used to introduce “the 
problem with our borders in Batken”:
“There was a time when the settled peoples of the Ferghana Valley feared us 
[Kyrgyz] as great warriors. In those days, all the cities in this region existed only 
due to the whim of the Kyrgyz: we controlled those who were in power in 
Qoqand, Khujand, Osh, Andijon. Then, Russia came and they created an office 
in Tashkent, which was still Kazakh back then. We Kyrgyz and Kazakhs could 
not read or write back then, but the Uzbeks could, and they used their skills to 
                                                          
26 Outline of the EU-UNDP Border Management Assistance Programme in the Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan.
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steal much of our land. We were not so clever: we loved our freedom and our 
sheep and horses. But they learned Russian and drew the very borders we now 
fight over. Before the Bolshevik Revolution [in 1917] we roamed everywhere 
and defended our way of life [byt’]: this is why there are Kyrgyz in all Central 
Asia, and also in China and Afghanistan. Today in this region, we are left with 
just Batken. This is like an island, left over after the sea washed everything else 
away. Truly, our lands have shrunk!”27
By employing an ethno-political terminology which would have been unrec-
ognizable in the period presented here, memories of connectivity are empha-
sized alongside the power that directly derived from such connectivity. Such 
memories of historical control are vivid and dominated by a Kyrgyz point of 
view that, in the nationalizing language of contemporary post-Soviet Central 
Asia, is able to draw upon commonly accepted notions of the Kyrgyz geo-
body,28 that mountainous island “left over after the sea.” Tellingly, it is the 
collusion of neighbors (the “Uzbeks”) with outsiders (“Russia”) that intro-
duced the territorializing state here by employing a foreign language (Rus-
sian), and not the outsiders themselves. From such a perspective, Kyrgyz 
have been stranded in their lands by historical processes that have now cul-
minated in enclosure.
Disconnecting the Formerly Connected
Distant debates over narratives of enclosure and filtering along “suitable cor-
ridors,” of the penetration of undesirable goods and individuals from Af-
ghanistan, and of the need to reintegrate Kyrgyzstan into a world that, until 
1991, it had clearly been a part of sit uneasily with a people that have a tradi-
tion of negotiating regional interaction in the face of a succession of polities 
claiming their allegiances to an array of political enterprises. Seen from the 
perspective of Batken, Kyrgyzstan’s new territoriality represents a deteriora-
tion of local connectivity; “regional cooperation” was a given fact of socio-
economic life in the decades prior to independence:
                                                          
27 As recorded in Batken Town, September 2013. Amir’s imagery is closely related to the 
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and who conquered Chinese and Turkic peoples alike.
28 For the concept of the geobody, see Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped. A History of the 
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“Before the end of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and Tajiks would sit 
and discuss important matters like water and schools and family problems for 
many hours. Our respective kolkhoz cooperated on all these matters. These days 
we only meet to resolve business questions: what is the current price of potatoes 
or petrol in Osh [Kyrgyzstan], or Andijon [Uzbekistan], or Isfara [Tajikistan]? 
Where are the border guards today, and how much money do they demand if en-
countered? Before independence we all had the freedom to move, but now we 
have all shrunk in terms of geography and of ambition: we used to know the 
places personally that we talked about, our mines and mills and refineries 
worked, and we talked about more important things than potatoes and road 
blocks.”29
It is the existence of such slowly decaying connectivity that poses the conun-
drum that Batken finds itself dealing with today and with which a new state 
rhetoric of territorial boundedness must compete: memories of recent and 
larger, regional exchange figure more prominently than do official contem-
porary characterizations of exchange across the new borders of the region. 
Rural and, in present-day geopolitical terms, remote, livelihoods here have 
for a long time depended on connectedness within the larger region of the 
Ferghana Valley. Traditionally, the entire valley successfully cultivated fruit 
and various cereal crops as well as being a renowned area for horse and cattle 
breeding. However, during the Soviet period and as a consequence of collec-
tivization in the late 1920s, the valley’s abundant water resources were redi-
rected to cotton monoculture and the various food and fodder crops were 
subsequently heavily marginalized. Cotton production depended on the eco-
nomic integrity of the entire region due to the vital necessity of the water 
resources from upstream Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and food for this region 
was imported from other parts of the Union, most notably from western Sibe-
ria. Hence, within the Soviet economy, Batken was intricately linked to wide 
markets and diverse supply chains. The dissolution of the USSR entailed the 
hardening of the formerly administrative borders, making the water supply 
for the cotton fields (predominantly in the Uzbekistani segment of the valley) 
an international issue, due to Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s dependency on 
the same water for electricity generation. Today, the market space of the Fer-
ghana Valley, the bread basket of the entire region, is politically (and hence 
economically) more fragmented than ever before in its ancient agricultural 
history. More significant for local residents in the three post-Soviet parts of 
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the valley, however, is that infrastructure was similarly designed with one 
market space in mind, thereby newly affecting the transportation of food and 
goods, none of which were any longer produced self-sufficiently by any one 
of these three states.
“Where did these new borders come from? When they were designed in 
my grandfather’s days nobody could have wanted to mark them with fences, 
mines or police!”30 For the longest part of their lifetime, the borders of the 
Ferghana Valley were indeed marked on paper only: there were no customs 
posts, border zones, or checkpoints on the infrastructure connecting the Re-
publics. Locals in internal borderlands experienced the boundary’s existence 
due to the existence of the respective Republic’s state institutions (e.g., lan-
guage use in schools and insignia on local militias’ uniforms) rather than 
border control mechanisms. While archival information on internal bounda-
ries remains difficult to obtain (and seems to have been marked in contradic-
tory ways on Soviet-era maps),31 the internal boundaries most Soviet citizens 
had to deal with in general were those engendered by the system of collectiv-
ization and the subsequent restrictions on freedom of abode rather than ones 
between Republics. “The boundaries of the kolkhoz [collective farm] were 
far, far more important to us than the borders to the neighboring Republics” 
is a common statement encountered in Batken when locals talk about their 
experiences with border control prior to the imposition of the new practices 
of the territorializing post-Soviet state of the early twenty-first century.32
The battle against mestnichestvo (“localism”), regarded as the antithesis 
of socialist nationalization policy, was fought in the arenas of internal delimi-
tation (the bordering of oblast’s and raions) and, most importantly, in the 
new institution of the kolkhoz. Kolkhoz were not simply units of production 
but rather socio-economic communities often bringing together several vil-
lages in order to establish the key locus of all in-depth economic develop-
ment in the under-industrialized, un-urbanized South of the Soviet Union.33
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31 Such maps and contestations over unclear cartographic inclusion of specific territories (and 
the naming of individual villages in multiple languages) have figured prominently in dip-
lomatic exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, just as they have in the long-
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32 Interview with Amir, September 2013, in Batken Town.
33 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia. The Creation of Nations (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 
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Collectivization, economic modernization, and sovietization all had been part 
of the drive behind the creation of the kolkhoz, and kolkhoz served as the 
most immediate encounter locals in Central Asia had with the state’s territo-
rializing strategies, in particular after 1932, when a new passport system cre-
ated categories of places for which individuals needed special permission to 
live. This had the effect of tying rural people to their respective kolkhoz and 
as such represented a central strategy in Soviet governing structures.34 When 
people in Batken today emphasize perceptions of a loss of mobility and, 
through this, a depreciation of practices of socio-economic exchange, it is the 
loss of institutionalized patterns of exchange within and between kolkhoz
“territories” that is inferred. Long experiences here with borders (through the 
kolkhoz) are centrally characterized by regarding them as marking the edge 
of a local belonging rather than in the enclosing and filtering function they 
are meant to fulfill for the sovereign states of the Ferghana Valley. It is these 
edges of local belonging that are now being claimed in the name of the state.
The Margins of Land and Belonging as a Local Resource
The borders that figure so prominently in local lifeworlds in the tripartite 
Ferghana Valley are here to stay, even despite the observation that these for-
mer administrative-only boundaries were never designed to delimit inde-
pendent and sovereign states. Characterizations by Kyrgyzstani borderland-
ers of their complexly bordered homeland in Batken overwhelmingly focus 
on conflict over enfranchisement and belonging rather than contesting the 
existence of these borderlines themselves:
“This here is Kyrgyz land—Tajiks should not be allowed to build houses on it, 
and Uzbeks should not be allowed to steal the water that comes from Kyrgyz 
mountains and flows through Kyrgyz valleys. Tajiks and Uzbeks are neighbors 
and sometimes guests, and they should stay neighbors and guests rather than pre-
tending to become family by moving in and demanding our things.”35
In their interaction with anthropologists, journalists and government repre-
sentatives, control over land and access to water is expressed in the language 
of citizenship in the post-Soviet state which, since the time of its inception as 
one of the ethno-territorial Soviet Republics, has come to be seen as a politi-
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35 Interview with Orozbek, September 2013, in Batken Town.
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cal homeland for a specific titular ethnic “nation.” Building upon an idiosyn-
cratic selection of “national attributes,” by 1936 (the year of the final changes 
to administrative borders in Central Asia) Soviet ethnographers and adminis-
trators believed they had identified territories that would be best suited as 
“containers” in which the national dialectic would play itself out and to 
which members of any given nationality would gravitate.36 The socialist 
homelands thus devised, in theory, were to be ethnically homogenous in an 
administrative sense: cadre distribution, linguistic education, and control 
over resources (both in terms of economic extraction as well as symbolic 
control over these within the framework of the Soviet state) were to be in the 
hands of the titular group. Because of access to local institutions (such as 
schooling) and the right to “national particularities” (such as practicing cer-
tain socio-economic ways of life), the delimitation of homeland and nation 
(in effect, the “internal bordering” of the constituent parts of the Soviet Un-
ion) mattered greatly to those who found new administrative boundaries on 
their doorsteps and who, as a consequence, found themselves the objects of 
new narratives of exclusion and inclusion.
Contestation by locals here of the precise demarcation of territory be-
longing to one or another state-administered homeland is by no means a nov-
el phenomenon: arguing for the renegotiation of borderlines by employing 
the language of contemporary normative orders has a long tradition in the 
Ferghana Valley. By using the terminology of the day, groups who were in 
the process of understanding themselves to be Kyrgyz or Tajik or Uzbek al-
ready petitioned the Soviet state throughout the 1920s and 1930s with the 
aim of securing certain territories (and with them, certain resources) for 
themselves. In doing so, “petitioners did not question the official assumption 
that ‘nationality’ was linked to land and other resources. Instead, the peti-
tioners argued that they were entitled to such resources as a matter of nation-
al rights.”37 Archival research has shown that locals actively participated in 
this process and exhibited considerable skill in molding revolutionary territo-
rial realignments into pre-revolutionary, pre-existing boundaries between 
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local groups.38 Thus, the delimitation of Ferghana borders was a dynamic 
process of interaction between local elites and the distant centre in Moscow, 
even if this process (as we have seen above) has come to be portrayed locally 
as a collusion of certain groups of locals (“the Uzbeks” in one common such 
representation) with the distant state.
By and large, the socialist state did not invent the categories to which 
people were to ascribe themselves, but it did objectify the categories of Kyr-
gyz-ness, Uzbek-ness, or Tajik-ness as well as tie them to a notion of right-
ful, and exclusive, territorial belonging.39 Today’s states in Central Asia have 
neither contested nor renegotiated these ethno-political identities, but today’s 
borderlines between these states now apportion not only access to local insti-
tutions but also inclusion into mutually antagonistic and economically inde-
pendent political systems. In an era of narratives that elevate allegiance to the 
state over locally defined and hybrid belongings—a time in which, most re-
cently, sanctions for violation of territory have actually begun to be imple-
mented—“nationality” as expressed through “citizenship” has remained a 
resource for borderlanders. Indeed, the increasingly strong language used by 
the state to argue the legitimacy of enforcing borders in places like Batken 
has made available a powerful weapon for locals in the fraught conflicts over 
land and water: by using citizenships to classify “theft” of land, villagers 
suggest a threat to the state as a whole rather than just conflict between indi-
viduals or residents of neighboring localities. In other words, while conflict 
between Kyrgyz herders over pasture rights should be resolved locally or by 
the oblast’ police (who, however, are generally not seen locally as reliable or 
impartial arbitrators), conflict over water usage (that frequently depends on 
Soviet-era canals that criss-cross borders) attracts the attention of state secu-
rity forces, the border police, and international observers alike and can, there-
fore, in local perceptions be assured to be decided a priori in favor of the 
Kyrgyz party’s interest precisely because higher level authorities are not seen 
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as acting impartially as long as “rightful belonging” is shown to be at stake. 
Once again, petitioning the state in support of local causes has become a 
strategy that can yield advantages, and this has become a crucial local re-
source in a region that in most other respects has had much to lose from the 
new disconnectivity of the early twenty-first century.
Reappraisals of “New” Border Control
The new regimes of border control that have been taking hold steadily in 
Batken oblast’ in recent years are a clear sign for residents that the state has 
finally arrived, on the ground and in everyday life. This arrival is taking 
place in an environment already characterized by strong discourses and tradi-
tions of interaction between groups marked by different categories of nation-
ality and citizenship. I have shown how Kyrgyz borderlanders here empha-
size “local shrinking,” expressed in terms of the loss of regional-now-
international connectivity and “ambition”; simultaneously, more direct ave-
nues of interaction with the Kyrgyzstani state have opened up: relations be-
tween certain villages and villagers have become relations between states, 
and the forces of border control are the vehicles of this contextual shift. 
Equipped with a newly legitimated language of protection and sovereignty, 
these forces implement notions of citizenship through, for example, the prac-
tice of document checks. Adopting the “professional approach to border 
management” suggested to the government by foreign advisors and their do-
nors and which forms a vital pillar of both Kyrgyzstan’s international stand-
ing as well as providing much needed budgetary relief, the separation of in-
tricately interwoven lifeworlds is rapidly taking place here. A striking feature 
of new notions of separated territoriality, and a clearly visible instance of the 
inscription of sovereignty onto local landscapes, has been the construction of 
new infrastructures to replace Soviet-era arteries that nowadays violate state 
boundedness. Critically supported by donor money, such new infrastructures 
that eliminate the need to cross borderlines allow the state to perceive its ac-
cess to Kyrgyzstani villages as being completely under sovereign control 
rather than dependent on another state’s regime of border control and, as a 
consequence thereof, subject to unilateral enclosure by a neighboring state. 
From the perspective of the newly accessible locales, however, the burgeon-
ing narrative of disconnectivity of recent years is cemented through the out-
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side support so loudly proclaimed on the ubiquitous information boards 
adorned with European Union flags.
The “professionalization” of the agents of border control very much has 
an impact on the ways in which local lifeworlds are changing:
“The old system was for us—the new system is for them. Back then, if we didn’t 
cooperate with Uzbeks or Tajiks we could be accused of being unpatriotic to the 
[Soviet] state, of undermining the friendship of the peoples. We were all in this 
together, back then. Now, if we cooperate one-to-one with them we are accused 
of being smugglers, of not being vigilant enough about militants coming here. 
Now, we are traitors to our nation.”40
Significantly, border control matters because it matters to borderlanders—the 
agents of border control can be co-opted, cooperated with, or evaded but they 
cannot be ignored. In order to live their lives at the state’s margins, the intri-
cate and changing structures of hierarchical command, military control, ef-
fective gatekeeper power, and functioning bureaucratic channels and its lan-
guage of interaction must be learned by locals. The “old” system, in force 
from the time of independence until the current drive for professionalization, 
was negotiated between borderlanders and the Kyrgyzstani border forces in 
the frame of Soviet-era legitimacies with its own specific conventions of in-
teraction. In that environment, “border guards would depend on us for their 
everyday needs such as cash, food, and sometimes accommodation”41; sala-
ries were not paid on a regular basis by the state, conscripts were young and 
inexperienced, and officers knew that basic survival depended on coopera-
tion with locals. Cash was collected for the “crime” of violating an invisible 
border either through undocumented movement (in which case temporary 
exemption could be “purchased”) or by using Tajik somoni or Uzbek sum
instead of Kyrgyz som (where foreign currency would often in part be “con-
fiscated”). The “new” system, however, is far less reliant on local support: 
increased scrutiny from outsiders and, concomitantly, the increased reliability 
of state bodies that are starting to seem like employers suggests that, increas-
ingly, actually enforcing the borderline is to the advantage of border guards. 
Professionalization, in this regard, entails greater dependencies between such 
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agents and the state; for locals, the effect is most visible in fewer yet dearer 
“fines” for violation.
The juxtaposition between “us” and “them” points to the subtle shifts in 
locals’ appreciation of Kyrgyzstan’s new narrative of sovereignty. In casual 
conversation, locals in Batken are quick to point out their dislike of how bor-
ders are nowadays being controlled rather than, as I have argued above, re-
futing that borders themselves should in principle exist. Whereas conflicts 
invariably arising over land and water were negotiated between Kyrgyz, Ta-
jiks and Uzbeks, and border control had been co-opted, now these parties are 
on less equal footing. Taking a transborder perspective in order to identify 
the new differentials in interaction between these parties, experiences of non-
Kyrgyz “violators” cast light on this new reality:
“He was a young and new border guard and he asked to see my documents. I said 
I was a Tajik who had been selling melons to Kyrgyz friends here in Arka and 
that I’d never needed documents before. He told me Tajikistan ended at the 
southern edge of the road and that I should go and sell them in Tajikistan. He 
told me I was a trouble-maker—you know, driving up prices, trying to buy prop-
erty from the profit I make. I said I had a house and family in Gafurov [in Tajiki-
stan] and had been coming here for fifteen years every autumn, and he then ac-
cused me of maybe smuggling heroin or proselytizing Islam through my local 
friends. The bribe I paid wiped out all my profit—that’s the way it is these days I 
suppose, but why did he have to insult me by thinking I’m an Afghan?”42
The “us” of the old system included Tajik and Uzbek neighbors into negotia-
tion with the Kyrgyzstani state’s authorities; the new system’s “them” is the 
state and its novel type of control. The spaces in which non-Kyrgyz border-
landers can interact with Kyrgyz have shrunk, and their power to affect Kyr-
gyzstani border control has all but evaporated. The development of “trade 
corridors,” a central element in donor-sponsored activity here and designed, 
one suspects, with the state as a reference point rather than with the border-
lands themselves in mind, both disregards the strong networks that already 
exist between borderlanders and valorizes such exchange as betrayal—in the 
words of Orozbek as quoted above, “treachery to the nation.” Conflict be-
tween Kyrgyz and Tajiks certainly occurs frequently; and increasingly the 
Kyrgyzstani state is becoming involved by reinterpreting local conflict as a 
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matter to be addressed with the Tajikistani state. It is in this way that ethnic 
boundaries have finally been converted into state boundaries.
Beyond the domain of conflict over land control and water usage, locals 
show themselves to be uneasy with fresh categories of violation that have 
been appearing along these borders: accusations of narcotics trafficking, the 
spreading of new readings of Islam, and cross-border networks of armed and 
systematic opposition to the legitimacy of the post-Soviet state—a new lan-
guage of protection has taken hold, using the vocabulary of security, insur-
gency, and extremism. “Why does the OSCE build new guard posts up on 
the hills instead of much-needed new houses here in town?” is a legitimate 
question in the eyes of Batken residents, and an answer that quickly is given 
often highlights the fact that “such pointless endeavors are allowed because 
if we are all seen to be involved then they receive lots of money.”43 Suggest-
ing that the state “sees heroin where there is none, and Taliban where there 
are none,” and that this takes place because the government in “distant and 
corrupt” Bishkek gains resources through such discourse, is a common 
stance in Batken.44 Accusing an unstable central government of corruption 
and self-interest is a damning statement by no means limited to remote Bat-
ken oblast’, and yet here locals have been intimately confronted with Kyr-
gyzstan’s policies relating to the conflict in Afghanistan. A new generation 
of border guards serving here and trained in donor-financed facilities is 
armed with the knowledge that “[t]he Ferghana Valley area is especially 
prone to volatility, and the high degree of criminality associated with traf-
ficking in drugs, arms and people is a major destabilizing factor mitigating 
against the rule of law, the development of social capital and increased living 
standards for the poor.”45 Locals muse on who, exactly, the new language of 
protection is designed to protect.
The ongoing delimitation of borders in the Ferghana Valley is, under 
such conditions, by no means a simple demarcation of the limit of the state’s 
affairs and, thus, not at all a matter of little relevance to locals. Once agents 
of border control begin to actually implement the everyday separation of mu-
tually dependent socio-economic systems by pressing the parameters of ex-
change into state-sanctioned modes, local interests will suffer:
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45 Outline of the EU-UNDP Border Management Assistance Programme in the Republic of 
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“More borders mean more problems. These problems arise from us no longer 
knowing how to talk to our neighbors in a common language, or them to us. The 
conflict we then have makes Bishkek want more security for us. And this means 
more border control, and more borders than we already have. Of what use are 
new border markets then? We already have those, don’t we? But they’re illegal, 
or so they say.”46
For borderlanders in Batken it is markets that play a central role. Trade and 
markets function as lubricants of interaction between different ethnic groups 
who are nowadays citizens of different countries. These markets thrive off 
price differentials arising from the “nationalization” of economies. The new 
enclosures that have been suggested to Kyrgyzstan put the state and its needs 
at the centre of the state’s attention, as expressed in the (il)legality of certain 
types of exchange. In this reasoning, border control becomes a function of 
Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy rather than the sovereignty that it desires to de-
liver to its citizens. Interviewees in the Kyrgyzstani section of the Ferghana 
Valley are quick to point out that trade takes place despite the state, and not 
because of it or its “new foreign friends.” From such a perspective, the 
“strong political will” invoked by the state in the context of its desire to clari-
fy its limits through delimitation in order to resolve the dilemma of sovereign 
control over its territory can only be seen as treachery to the interests of those 
it purports to “protect”: Kyrgyz in Batken understand very well that their 
livelihoods are directly interwoven with structures of interaction that by their 
very nature violate the precepts of “new” border control.
Conclusion: Borders Beyond the Reach of the State
“The problem with our borders here in the Ferghana Valley is that everybody 
seems to have an interest in having them.”47 To be concrete, the spaces at 
Kyrgyzstan’s edges have become populated by a complex mix of state repre-
sentatives, delegates of outside concern, alleged agents of subversion of the 
state, and local borderlanders professing a belonging to mutually exclusive
categories of ethnic and national identities, all of whom compete for a stake 
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in the permissible parameters of local lifeworlds. The borders that exist here 
today are “problematic” not because they exist, but rather because their en-
forcement is seen as crucial to the notion of legitimate sovereignty in a young 
state. Borderlands, and with them borderlanders, loom large in their im-
portance for the state, far outweighing their socio-geographic peripherality. 
They are very much seen as an integral part of state territory in all official 
understandings—to imply otherwise can be seen as calling into question a 
state’s territoriality and, hence, a challenge to its integrity, its very existence. 
And yet this is precisely what processes within borderlands, and between 
borderlands and centers, seem to suggest: while the state may be seen by 
many as the geographical container of modern society, borderlands refute 
such assumptions by being, at least in part, larger than such containers.48 In 
places like Batken notions of temporal and political spatialization go far be-
yond the borders of Kyrgyzstan when regarded through a local lens: borders 
here are reproduced by using languages of titularity and enfranchisement 
directly descended from an older order, designed with a different, supra-
regional notion of inclusion in mind. In their argumentation today, Kyrgyz 
borderlanders invoke a Soviet-era, specifically Russian spatialization that 
outweighs Kyrgyzstan’s “shrunken” spaces in its legitimacy, and this is strik-
ingly underlined by the importance given by today’s antagonists to maps 
drawn up by Russian emissaries that were originally intended to outline eth-
nic distribution in the Ferghana Valley but now are taken to denote “historic 
ownership” of specific territories.49
In its search for establishing a similar but contemporary spatial legitima-
cy, the post-Soviet state has turned to a new narrative that is to be inscribed 
into borderland locales such as Batken in order to aid “spatial socialization 
and the territorialization of meaning”50 in a Kyrgyzstani context. Whereas in 
the Soviet period borderlander loyalty was directly wedded to a representa-
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tion of the margins of the socialist state as being at the forefront of patriotism 
to a socialist project that understood itself as being an island within an inimi-
cal socio-economic environment,51 today it is the ethno-territorial geobody of 
“the Kyrgyz” to which citizens are to subscribe. Choosing a narrative of dip-
lomatic interaction which casts itself as part of, rather than aloof from, wider 
global concern over the dynamics playing out in Afghanistan since 2001, 
Kyrgyzstan has placed itself firmly within that state’s neighborhood and, 
thus, directly connected questions of domestic control over its territory with 
its legitimacy as a state. This is how we can understand a contradiction often 
pointed out by “the unpatriotic” in Batken: the one form of exchange that 
today purportedly takes place across these borders, and which could be seen 
as a form of the “regional cooperation” proposed by international donor bod-
ies, is precisely the one form of exchange that the state must interdict if it is 
to be part of today’s world order—the trafficking of narcotics, a rare instance 
of a truly post-Soviet, transnational economic flow. Alongside the other un-
desirable transnational flow, namely that of a form of Islamic interpretation 
and teaching frequently glossed as “Wahhabi” or “fundamentalist” in this 
region, these two processes legitimate the need for the “new” border control 
discussed above as well as call its practices into question. Neither type of 
exchange will be permitted by the state to form the content of a new shared 
economic space in the Ferghana Valley. It is important to note that border-
landers in Batken are by no means equivocal in their opinions in this matter; 
these types of new flows find no support amongst them. However, local op-
position to this type of post-Soviet exchange centers on the lack of resources 
generated at a local level rather than agreeing with outside condemnation of 
the qualitative nature of this exchange.
When asked about Afghanistan and their feelings regarding the end of 
Western involvement there in 2016, locals in Batken are dismissive:
“It’s not our problem but Bishkek’s or Moscow’s problem. We only care about 
the price of petrol and fruit here. We don’t care for the Taliban and they don’t 
care for us. There aren’t any here, there never have been any here, and if they 
come after 2016 it will be to make war on [President] Karimov [of Uzbekistan] 
and not on us or on Bishkek.”52
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In the Soviet period, the connection between the inhabitants of the Ferghana 
Valley and Afghanistan clearly derived specifically from the Soviet promo-
tion of ethnic transfrontier ties between titular groups in Central Asia and 
their “national brethren” in northern Afghanistan in the 1980s, which were 
argued at this time to correspond to one another in the framework of socialist 
nationality policy.53 And such ties were directed southwards, with the Soviet 
Republics serving as models within this system. As a consequence, an image-
ry of invasion predominates in the minds of the many individuals in Kyrgyz-
stan, the so-called Afgantsy, who participated in the Soviet war effort there 
between 1979 and 1988 as soldiers, engineers, and drivers. Importantly, what 
was being taken to the south and subsequently brought back home again was, 
among other things, the knowledge that the state was powerful. Now this has 
been turned on its head: whereas before locals were actively involved in such 
types of (Soviet) state activity, today a passivity is felt to predominate in the 
manner in which the (Kyrgyzstani) state seems to subject itself to its geopo-
litical environment. In this vein, in contemporary Kyrgyzstan it is not the 
dwindled ethnic Kyrgyz minority of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan region that 
figures in Kyrgyzstani representations of Afghanistan and how that troubled 
state relates to the Ferghana Valley. Far more, in the language of the day it is 
the image of an Afghanization of the region in the sense of local insurgency 
financed by illicit trade networks and legitimated in the name of impermissi-
ble interpretations of religion that holds ascendancy. Seemingly at the mercy 
of a new type of global flow, the inscription of the state onto local landscapes 
embodies the powerlessness of the state. Today it is borderlanders them-
selves and their lifeworlds who are now “a problem to be dealt with” in the 
interest of the wider world.
A “border-less” world may well be developing for the new, highly mo-
bile transnational elites of the Western world, where border crossing has be-
come a formality and, within the European Schengen space, in effect an in-
visible process for the vast majority of crossers. Yet the Central Asian Re-
publics have experienced the reverse of this development: for decades, cross-
ing the internal boundaries of the Soviet Union (i.e., those lines that today 
represent formal state borders) was more a matter of internal travel docu-
ments related to the Soviet system as a whole. Today, however, the region 
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has become politically territorialized: goods need export/import documents, 
individuals might need permits and visas, and mutually exclusive citizenships 
have been created that superimpose a new nationality over ethnic identity. 
Thus, Central Asia has become less inter-connected over the past two dec-
ades, and borders have impacted local lives in ways never imagined before in 
the region. In this sense, “inter-connection” across borders today is shifting 
to signify the interaction of states with each other while borderland-to-
borderland interaction is in steady decline. This is the arena in which the dy-
namics of post-2016 border-making and border reproduction are unfolding.
